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Although developing countries face a drastic increase in their greenhouse gas emissions, 
mitigation actions against climate change do not rank high among their priorities. The 
obvious reason lies in the necessity for them to continue the development process, which 
is characterised by pressing needs other than emission control. For developing countries 
the real problem is thus not emissions but economic growth. Therefore the key question is 
whether or not the Kyoto Protocol provides an opportunity for growth and thus for their 
economic development. The only way to accelerate the participation of developing 
countries in climate agreements - and therefore to come closer to the goal of a global 
climate control - is to design strategies which enable their economic development. The 
dilemma of reducing emissions on a global scale while ensuring growth in the poorer 
regions can only be solved if there are possibilities embedded in the agreements which 
can contribute to the sustainable development of those regions. As a consequence, greater 
emphasis must be placed on the economic development dimension of the Kyoto Protocol 
as far as the impact on developing countries is concerned. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
For developing countries the problem of global warming is not equally important as for 
industrialised nations. Even if less developed countries (LDCs) are suffering from pollution and 
recognise that the fast-growing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions pose serious problems to 
them, they have other more pressing needs to cope with. In particular, developing countries put 
the goal of continued economic growth at the first place in order to enhance their process of 
development.  
 
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that global warming can only be tackled on a global scale in the 
long run. Due to its global public good nature, an approach designed to seriously induce nations 
to curb global warming has to include the participation of developing countries. The last decade 
demonstrates that LDCs are increasingly contributing to the build-up of greenhouse gases, even 
though their per-capita intensity is still very low compared to that of industrialised countries. 
The important role that developing countries play in the context of climate change policy is 
evidenced by the recent events: announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, 
President George W. Bush justified his decision on the basis of the high economic costs, one the 
one hand, and of the missing involvement of developing countries, on the other. Even if this 
aspect of the U.S, position is often regarded as too harsh given that industrialised countries 
clearly bear the main responsibility of the actual GHG accumulation, there is general consensus 
that developing countries need to be gradually involved in international efforts to curb global 
warming for a climate policy to be successful. 
 
In fact, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) itself 
mentions on several occasions the principle and goal of sustainability. In particular, Article 3 of 
the Convention calls for the promotion of sustainable development, taking into account the 
specific conditions of each Party and the fact that “… economic development is essential for 
adopting measures to address climate change” (UNFCCC, Art.3-4). 
 
At the same time, even though they do not (yet) actively participate in international climate 
policy, developing countries are already affected by the ongoing efforts to curb global warming. 
International trade linkages imply that developing countries experience effects from the 
emission controls adopted in committed countries.
1 Issues that attracted attention in this context 
include the distribution of economic impacts induced among other reasons by shifts in energy-
intensive industries, the problem of carbon leakage and the changes in the terms of trade and the 
capital flows between countries caused by international emissions trading. The key question is 
whether climate policy in general or international emissions trading in particular is capable of 
altering the distribution of abatement costs and of welfare gains in order to mitigate the effects 
on international competition, making the developing countries thus better off by the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The present chapter is concerned precisely with this issue. In particular, we try to understand 
here whether climate policy could induce benefits for developing countries that enhance their 
economic growth. More specifically, we want to see if the Kyoto Protocol incorporates aspects 
apt to solve the actual dilemma of the developing world. This study is intended first to provide 
an overview of research studies undertaken in this context. Subsequently, using an integrated 
assessment model enriched with endogenous technical change, we provide additional new 
evidence to bear on the same key questions. 
 
 
                                                       
1 On this aspect see Galeotti and Kemfert (2002).   
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2.  The Effects of the Kyoto Protocol on Developing Countries 
 
Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, industrialised countries committed themselves 
to binding emission reduction targets. Acknowledging the historic responsibility for the actual 
accumulation of greenhouse gases, the Kyoto agreement requires that industrialised countries 
make the first step towards global climate change control. In particular, all countries should take 
action in order to protect the global climate “in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities (Preamble of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change). 
 
However, the international trade which characterises the world nowadays implies that the 
consequences of the GHG control measures - even if taken only by a subset of countries - will 
be transmitted to the whole world economy, and therefore also to those countries which have 
not agreed to reduce their GHG emissions. Even though LDCs have not taken obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol, they can be affected by international climate policy, also depending on the 
scope of a possibly implemented emissions trading scheme. Through trade and investment links, 
developing countries are thus very likely to feel the economic consequences of abatement 
activities in industrialised countries. For instance, in order to meet their emission reduction 
targets, the Annex B group is likely to reduce its demand for fossil fuels which in turn would 
lead to the reduction in the world price for fossil fuels or to a relocation of energy-intensive 
industries (Polidano, Jotzo, Heyhoe, Jakeman, Woffenden, and Fisher, 2000). Developing 
countries can be influenced by the direct cost of emissions-reducing activities in industrialised 
countries or by the changes in investment due to expectations on future costs. Furthermore, 
LDCs can be affected by changes in terms of trade of energy and non-energy goods and by 
payments for emission permits (Bernstein, Montgomery, and Rutherford, 1999). 
 
2.1 Welfare  Effects 
 
The key mechanism influencing the distribution of the welfare losses and gains consists in the 
shift in a country’s terms of trade following the mitigation activities of the committed parties.
2 
 
2.1.1 The “Pure” Kyoto Protocol, Without Use of the Proposed Flexible Mechanisms 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, GHG emission control in Annex B countries leads to changes in 
trade volumes and prices which in turn determine the losses and gains in Non-Annex B 
countries. In particular, emission restrictions cause Annex B countries to reduce their demand 
for domestic and imported energy since they will face a higher cost of using carbon-emitting 
fuels. As a consequence, the manufacturing costs of their energy-intensive goods are increased 
and so are the prices of their exports, some of them being directed towards the developing 
world. At the same time, the global demand for carbon-emitting fuels decreases, implying an 
overall reduction of the international prices. As an additional impact, emission control programs 
could being about an overall depression of economic activity in the committed countries which 
could in turn lower their demand for imports. Such a reduced demand could hurt developing 
countries, since some of the imports could come from them. 
 
On the whole, emission restrictions will change the patterns of consumption and production 
within the Annex B countries, affecting the flow of internationally traded goods. This can have 
very complex consequences, benefiting some countries while hurting others. In particular, it is 
                                                       
2 Terms of trade represent the suitably weighted ratio of the prices of a country’s exports to the prices of 
its imports.   4
likely that energy exporting regions suffer adverse movements of their terms of trade while 
there is the tendency for energy importers to face favourable movements in their terms of trade. 
 
Looking at the original version of the Protocol, the conclusion generally drawn in literature is 
that Annex B countries would suffer welfare losses in the range of 0.5 to 2.0% relative to a no-
protocol situation (Jacoby, Eckaus, Ellerman, Prinn, Reiner, and Yang, 1997; Jacoby and Sue 
Wing, 1999; Light, Kolstad and Rutherford, 1999; Babiker and Jacoby, 1999; Burniaux and 
Truong 2002). At the same time Eastern European countries such as Russia would experience 
welfare gains due to their improved comparative advantage. If the Kyoto agreement is 
implemented without recourse to emissions trading, Non-Annex B countries are only affected 
through the prices and quantities of the goods traded with the Annex B group. In particular, 
developing countries will only be affected by changes in terms of trade and changes in 
investment.  
 
As the main consequence of the Kyoto Protocol Ellerman, Jacoby, and Decaux (1998) expect an 
increase in the developing countries’ production and export of energy intensive goods. By using 
the MIT’s EPPA model which is based on the GTAP data set, Babiker and Jacoby (1999) and 
Babiker, Reilly and Jacoby (1999) investigate the situation of the Non-Annex B countries and 
come up with mixed findings: some of these countries suffer welfare losses in excess of those of 
the Annex B (e.g., the Persian Gulf), while others experience net welfare gains (e.g., India).  
 
Using an intertemporal computable general equilibrium and multi regional trade model for the 
global economy, Kemfert (1999) identifies negative impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on 
developing countries, explaining this result by an decrease of international energy use which 
consequently leads to productivity and international energy price cutbacks.  
 
Also Böhringer and Rutherford (1999) find substantial spillover effects from Annex B countries 
to the Non-Annex B. These are caused by the restriction of fossil fuel use which implies that 
primary factors are employed less productively and that economic activities in the industrialised 
countries are reduced. As a consequence, terms of trade deteriorate for developing countries, 
resulting into adverse effects and welfare losses. 
 
Burniaux and Truong (2002) use an extended version of the GTAP model which is enriched by 
energy-environment linkages (referred to as GTAP-E) and also find that the energy exporters 
among the developing countries suffer adverse impacts and might even lose more than the 
Annex B countries. 
 
Böhringer and Löschel (2002) base their carbon abatement policy analysis on a specific CGE 
model and find that adjustments on the international energy markets after the Kyoto Protocol’s 
implementation represent the most important category of international spillovers resulting from 
trade. Their findings explain why developing regions that are fuel exporters suffer welfare 
losses whereas those regions being net importers of fuels in general can benefit from carbon 
abatement policies. 
 
Brown, Kennedy, Polidano, Woffenden, Jakeman, Graham, Jotzo, and Fisher (1999) and 
Polidano et al. (2000) use GTEM, a global general equilibrium model, and confirm that the 
Kyoto Protocol will have a number of economic consequences for developing countries. In 
particular, the latter study finds trade and investments effects as the most important indirect 
impacts on LDCs. The lower world prices and lower export volumes to Annex B regions imply 
reduced earnings from fossil fuel export which represent, together with the higher import prices 
of energy-intense goods, the main negative impact. Conversely, positive effects are given by an 
increase in the export competitiveness of non-Annex B producers of energy-intensive goods and 
the associated increase in investment levels. The net impact will depend on the trade and   
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production structure of each country and the authors conclude that those developing countries 
with a more diversified pattern of production and exports will be the less affected ones. 
 
McKibbin, Ross, Shackleton, and Wilcoxen (1999) look at the implications of the Kyoto 
Protocol using the G-Cubed model which consists of a set of eight regional general equilibrium 
models linked by consistent international flows of goods and assets. As a consequence, the 
authors manage to highlight the role of international trade and capital flows in global responses 
to the Kyoto Protocol which indeed seem to be important. When the Kyoto targets are achieved 
without allowing for any flexible mechanisms, they find that countries characterised by high 
abatement costs suffer a reduction in GDP, an outflow of capital, a depreciation of their 
exchange rates while their exports are stimulated. Countries with low abatement costs 
experience the opposite effect, driven mainly by inflows of capital.
3 For the case of LDCs, the 
authors find particularly interesting results. Both their GDP and GNP rise while the absence of 
emission reduction commitments implies further significant benefits through international 
policy transmission. Due to the exchange rate appreciation, caused by capital inflows, 
“…[e]xports become less competitive but imports become cheaper and the dollar value of LDC 
international debt falls dramatically, leading to a net improvement in the LDCs’ net international 
investment position in spite of significant capital inflows...” (McKibbin et al., 1999, p. 22) In 
addition, the Kyoto Protocol implies a decline in Annex B oil demand which consequently leads 
to a decline in the world oil prices, benefiting thereby the LDCs. 
 
Using the multi-sector, multi-regional trade MS-MRT model, Bernstein, Montgomery, and 
Rutherford (1999) investigate the international trade aspects of climate change policy, looking 
among other things at the distribution of impacts across countries. Also their findings confirm 
that the Kyoto restrictions on industrialised countries have negative welfare on oil-producing 
countries and mixed spillover effects on other Non-Annex B countries, pointing at the positive 
effects on energy-importing developing countries. In particular, they find that only China and 
India gain from the obligations defined in the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
From the discussion conducted above, we see that the main explanation of findings refers to 
changes in energy prices: due to the emission limits, demand for fossil fuel products in Annex B 
countries decreases, thereby lowering the market prices of all traded types of energy. As a 
further step, these effects on energy prices induce both changes in investment and output for 
energy-intensive industries and shifts in the terms of trade. In particular, manufacturing costs of 
energy intensive goods increase, even though the overall fall in Annex B demand for carbon-
emitting fuels induces a downward pressure on the international prices of carbon-intensive 
fossil fuels. The decisive factor, as noted above, is the shift in the terms of trade which follows 
the imposition of emission controls in the Annex B region. 
  
Looking at the shift in terms of trades from a Non-Annex B viewpoint, there are three 
potentially offsetting effects (Bernstein, Montgomery and Rutherford, 1999):  
 
(i)  As a consequence of the higher energy prices in the Annex B region caused by the 
emission limits, developing countries have to pay higher prices for the industrialised 
countries’ exports;  
(ii)  Due to a negative income effect which will follow the emission controls in 
industrialised countries, their demand for carbon-intensive goods will fall, thus inducing 
a downward pressure on the international prices of carbon-intensive fossil fuels. The 
                                                       
3 GDP increases because capital inflows reduce real interest rates and stimulate domestic demand in the 
short run while they raise the capital stock in the longer run. At the same time, capital inflows lead to 
reduced exports since they appreciate the exchange rate.   6
consequences will not only be felt by the Annex B but also by developing countries 
which receive lower revenues from their (oil) exports.  
(iii)  Since the manufacturing costs in industrialised countries increase, a substitution effect 
will strengthen the demand for energy-intensive goods produced in developing 
countries. 
 
Depending on the relative strength of these three effects, terms of trade improve or deteriorate 
for a given country and induce positive and negative welfare impacts for specific regions. In 
general, terms of trade movements which transfer income across countries are unfavourable to 
developing countries and favourable to the industrial ones. This holds when the Kyoto Protocol 
is implemented without a global emissions trading that includes developing countries. In 
particular, energy importing countries are likely to profit from the Kyoto Protocol, while many 
energy exporters are facing welfare losses. The higher the dependence on oil proceeds, the 
stronger are the adverse movements in the terms of trade of the economies in consideration.
4 
These “first-order” terms of trade effects in terms of energy price changes are transmitted to the 
rest of the Non-Annex B countries by the means of a larger set of income and price effects that 
propagate through the international economy. The literature shows that the implementation of 
the Kyoto Protocol does not benefit all Annex B economies because of positive terms of trade 
movements and that all Non-Annex B regions are adversely affected.
5 In addition, the 
distortions/problems related to the use of GNP as a measure of the welfare changes induced by 
GHG control are highlighted by basing their welfare estimates an equivalent variation criterion. 
As an example, notwithstanding the positive changes in their GNP, both China and South Africa 
suffer welfare losses from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol as a consequence of their 
adverse terms of trade effects.  
 
As a general rule, the results obtained in the existing research suggest that “…the higher GNP 
losses of Annex B are mitigated by favourable movements in these nations’ terms of trade, 
whereas the relatively lower GNP losses for oil-exporting countries are aggravated by 
unfavourable movements in their terms of trade” (Babiker, Reilly, and Jacoby, 1999, p. 9). 
 
In addition, Kemfert (2001) concludes that adverse effects suffered by certain developing 
countries due to negative international spillover effects are even stronger when the impacts of 
climate change are explicitly taken into account. Indeed, climate change impacts – covering 
both market and non-market damages – are particularly significant in those areas. 
 
Table 1 summarises the numerical findings of most of the cited papers as for the impact of the 
Kyoto Protocol on developing countries when no flexibility mechanisms are allowed. The table 
reports welfare (equivalent variation) and terms of trade changes.  
 
2.1.2 The Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol’s Flexible Mechanisms 
 
Ellerman, Jacoby, and Decaux (1998) examine the effects of the Kyoto Protocol on the 
developing countries using the marginal abatement curves generated by MIT’s EPPA model, a 
                                                       
4 For example, an oil-exporting Non-Annex B country will suffer welfare losses because its revenues 
from the oil exports shrink while at the same time it has to accept higher prices of energy-intensive goods 
from Kyoto-constrained regions. 
5  Bernstein, Montgomery and Rutherford (1999) find that other Asian countries more than offset the 
higher cost of imports from industrial countries with gains in terms of trade with OPEC. They are also 
able to shift to production of energy-intensive goods where they have an increased comparative advantage 
over the industrial countries. These countries also benefit from capital inflows and from their favourable 
position as exporters of energy-intensive goods.   
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computable general equilibrium model. In particular, the paper presents one of the first research 
studies addressing the question how differing schemes of CO2 emission trading affect 
developing countries, taking possible trade restrictions, variations in the CDM nature and the 
changes in international trade flows in goods and services into account. As a consequence of 
global emissions trading, Non-Annex B countries face incentives to reduce emissions in order to 
generate emission permits - “rights to emit” - for export. In addition to Russia, China and India 
are responsible for the main supply of emission permits. As a consequence of global trading, the 
total costs of cutting the global emissions as required by the Kyoto Protocol are reduced 
dramatically and Annex B regions therefore experience strong gains. By exporting emission 
permits, also the Non-Annex B regions gain, even though only about 11% of the gain obtained 
by the Annex B. In comparison to an emission trading system taking place only among the 
Annex B countries, the big loser of a global trading system is Russia which is indeed made 
worse off by widening the market. Even though Russia still gains in comparison to a situation 
without emissions trading, the value of its “hot air” decreases drastically and it exports less 
since it faces less incentives to reduce emissions due to a higher overall permit supply and a 
lower price. Compared to the no trade situation, there will be revenues from exporting permits, 
but there will be no significant increase in production and exports of energy intensive goods. In 
both cases, no trading and global trading, energy exporting Non-Annex B countries will 
experience adverse effects, but due to the lower carbon price and the substitution opportunities 
enabled by the broader market, the implications are less drastic in the case of global trading.  
 
Bernstein, Montgomery and Rutherford (1999) also find that the implementation of emissions 
trading improves the Kyoto Protocol’s implications on developing countries. The increase in 
supply and consequent reduction in the permit price which follow the establishment of global 
emissions trading benefit Non-Annex B regions by increasing demand for exports and permits. 
However, an exception are China and India: both a trading system restricted only to the Annex 
B and global trade harm these two countries; in particular under global trading pecuniary 
externalities disappear, whereas they were present and positive in a situation of restricted 
trading.  
 
The results obtained by Kemfert (1999) are in line with these findings. Indeed, emissions 
trading is found to improve both the situation of developed and developing countries. In 
particular, the model calculations reveal welfare improvements in the developing world which 
are due to international trade spillover effects. 
 
The main conclusions of this line of research is thus that the implementation of an emissions 
trading system can not only reduce the industrialised countries’ costs of meeting the Kyoto 
targets, but also provides a new source of export earnings for developing countries. Developing 
countries in general benefit from emissions trading, even though the effect will depend on the 
particular country and the success of emissions trading. In addition to the potential export 
revenues, energy exporting Non-Annex B countries are likely to have a strong interest in 
emissions trading since it specifically allows “Annex B parties to substitute reduced coal 
emissions abroad for reduced oil and gas emissions at home” (Ellerman, Jacoby, and Decaux, 
1998, p.21). This strong interest makes the Non-Annex B countries clear rivals to Russia, which 
is made worse off by enlarging an Annex B trading scheme to a global one. However, 
emphasising that both importing and exporting regions can achieve substantial gains, the 
implementation of an emissions trading scheme can not only bring profits in terms of new 
export opportunities, but also in terms of a lower number of distortions related to the Annex B 
economies. 
 
By changing the data set on which the EPPA model is based, Babiker and Jacoby (1999) and 
Babiker, Reilly, and Jacoby (1999) take into account the recent growth performance of key   8
nations like China and India.
6 Babiker and Jacoby (1999) analyse the case of an Annex B 
trading system open to China, which is granted about 95% of its projected 2020 emissions as a 
quota. In 2010 this initial allocation leads to an amount of 200MtC of Chinese “hot air”. This 
benefits both the energy-exporting nations and the Annex B countries, the first group because 
the oil price falls even less than in the case restricted to Annex B trading, whereas the second 
one profits from the larger set of permit suppliers. As expected, the energy importers are made 
even more worse off than under Annex B trading. Not surprisingly, as a consequence of its hot 
air and its low-cost emission reduction opportunities, China is the big winner of the situation. 
Due to the strong competition on the supply side, Russia suffers the highest losses in 
comparison with a trading scheme restricted to Annex B. Summarising, the effects of emissions 
trading are enhanced by the participation of a large developing country. The overall results thus 
do not change and confirm that the gains from emissions trading are substantial not only for the 
countries directly involved in the process. 
 
Böhringer and Löschel (2002) also emphasise the reduced international spillovers to Non-
Annex B countries induced by the introduction of emissions trading due to the smaller impact 
on the change in comparative advantage, as e.g. terms of trade. Similarly, Brown et al. (1999) 
and Polidano et al. (2000) show that the implementation of an emissions trading scheme can 
substantially reduce both the costs for Annex B countries to meet their targets and therefore also 
the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on the non-Annex B countries. 
 
The findings of Burniaux and Truong (2002) confirm that emissions trading enables a lower fall 
of the international oil price which consequently leads to a substantial reduction in the losses 
incurred by energy-exporting developing countries. In particular, a worldwide trading scheme 
would not only reduce the economic costs for both Annex B countries and energy exporters in 
the Non-Annex B, but it would even imply net gains for the permit-selling regions, above all for 
China and India. Also this study finds that Russia has a strong interest in restricting emissions 
trading only to the Annex B. 
 
Using the G-Cubed model which allows for international flows of goods and assets, McKibbin 
et al. (1999) find that Annex B permit trading has little effects on non-participating countries.
7 
In contrast, global trading would make the developing countries significantly worse off due to 
the substantial reduction of the amount of capital flows. Indeed, they would no longer benefit by 
capital inflows, exchange rate appreciations, reductions in the their debt burdens’ value or by 
lower world oil prices. Correspondingly, these countries experience a lower GDP and GNP than 
in the Annex B case and the no-trading case. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 summarise the numerical findings of the cited papers as for the impact of the 
Kyoto Protocol on developing countries when Annex B trading and global trade are respectively 
allowed. The tables report welfare (equivalent variation) and terms of trade changes.  
 
Philibert (2000) proposes a different emissions trading scheme based on the combination of two 
types of stakeholders which would be complimentary to the Clean Development Mechanism: 
there are, as usual, Annex B countries which face a binding emission limit, and in addition Non-
Annex B countries which are given emissions budgets rather than strict limits. Such a system 
                                                       
6 The EPPA model is now based on the GTAP dataset, allowing thus a greater sectoral and regional detail 
and a more recent benchmark (changed from 1985 to 1995). The previous versions of the model used the 
OECD GREEN model database. 
7 In general, the authors find that the equalisation of marginal mitigation costs and permit prices under 
such an international permit trading regime, together with the reduction in overall abatement due to the 
sale of the so-called “hot air” reduces the economic impacts of the Protocol.    
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would be beneficial both to Annex B and Non-Annex B countries: industrialised countries 
benefit from lower overall compliance costs while developing countries gain by the substantial 
capital inflows which in turn stimulate their economic growth. In addition, there are also 
benefits for the global climate system since developing countries face incentives to engage in 
abatement efforts instead of relying mainly on the aspect of “hot air”. 
 
Besides the mechanism of emissions trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) have been included as flexible mechanisms into the Kyoto Protocol in order 
to enable the cost-effective reduction of GHG emissions. The latter one, CDM, has attracted a 
lot of attention as a possibility to make industrialised and developing countries work together 
with the aim of promoting sustainable development. This mechanism offers industrialised 
countries the possibility to finance emission reductions in developing countries in order to gain 
credits from these activities. Apart from using the industrialised world’s technological 
knowledge to lower the carbon intensity of new investment in developing countries, the 
involvement of the developed world can substantially reduce the overall cost of meeting the 
Kyoto targets. The CDM has thus raised great expectations, but it is not yet clear whether there 
is any evidence for its positive implications on developing countries. 
 
For instance, Kete, Baumert, and Bhandari (2001) emphasise that the way CDM is financed – 
either by the public or the private sector – is responsible for the implications of this mechanism. 
Pointing at the risks of priority shifting they conclude that “…limited aid resources should 
continue to be reserved for capacity and institution building and not be allowed to directly 
finance CDM projects…” (Kete, Baumert, and Bhandari, 2001, p. 8). Instead, private 
investment as the main source of funding CDM projects would guarantee additional financial 
flows to developing countries that could indeed speed up the process of sustainable economic 
development. 
 
2.2 Environmental  Effects 
 
The implementation of the original version of the Kyoto Protocol leads to emission reductions 
in all the committed countries. When allowing for Annex B trading, Böhringer and Löschel 
(2002) find that global emissions increase with respect to the no-trade case due to the inclusion 
of “hot air”, although the contribution of LDCs to the overall emissions results to be slightly 
smaller than in the case without trading. Den Elzen and de Moor (2001) instead find that global 
emissions decrease by almost 9%, again partly due to a smaller contribution by developing 
countries than in the no trade case.
8 The largest percentage reduction can however be achieved 
under global trading, even though some of the participating regions increase their emissions due 
to the higher supply of emission permits resulting from the inclusion of developing countries. 
The greater the scope of trading, the lower the emission reduction in Kyoto-constrained 
countries. Nonetheless, Non-Annex B countries are reducing their emissions as a consequence 
of the incentives to create emission allowances by 18%, and together with OECD and Eastern 
European countries on a global scale they generate a reduction by 14% in  per capita emissions 
(Ellerman, Jacoby, and Decaux, 1998). 
 
In the debate about the environmental implications of the Kyoto Protocol, an additional aspect 
that attracts a lot of attention is the so-called “carbon leakage” which has multiple causes and 
whose intensity depends on several factors. As a consequence of price and income effects 
provoked by emission control programs in Annex B countries, an increase in the emissions of 
                                                       
8 Instead, Brown et al. (1999) find that developing countries increase their greenhouse gas emissions 
independently of the establishment of an Annex B trading scheme (which nonetheless reduces the amount 
of the emissions increase).   10
the non-constrained countries is expected. Therefore, efficiency losses take place. In particular, 
the increase in production costs of energy intensive goods in Annex B regions is likely to induce 
the outsourcing of these manufacturers to Non-Annex B countries. A second reason for leakage 
lies in the lower Annex B demand for carbon-emitting fuels, which induces a fall in the 
international energy prices. The lower price makes these fuels more attractive in non-
constrained regions and thus encourages their use in developing countries. The phenomenon of 
carbon leakage is confirmed by research studies which put its rate at about 6% and higher, 
depending among other reasons on the treatment of the existing distortions in the energy 
market.
9 An interesting aspect of the findings concerning carbon leakage is that China alone is 
already responsible for 30% of the leakage, and just five countries - China, India, Brazil, South 
Korea, and Mexico - account for more than 60% of the estimated total figure (Babiker and 
Jacoby, 1999). 
 
Table 4 summarise the numerical findings on carbon dioxide emissions under alternative 
regimens for the trading of emission permits.  
 
 
3.  Policy Measures Affecting the Implications of Kyoto Protocol 
 
The results of the above-mentioned simulation studies which focused on emissions trading are  
to be taken with caution, since the models used typically assume complete economic rationality 
and negligible transaction costs. However, it is likely that the potential trading gains will not 
immediately be experienced in their full scope but will slowly emerge, in line with the 
development of experiences and removal of distortions in energy markets. Some papers have 
explored the mechanisms which affect the implications of Kyoto Protocol for Non-Annex B 
countries and have investigated policy measures which help moderating the effects of the 
Protocol on LDCs.  
 
 
3.1 Strategic  behaviour 
 
The majority of studies investigating the effects of the Kyoto Protocol are based on the 
assumption of a competitive permit market. However, this idealistic picture is far from reality 
and can distort some of the conclusions. A few recent papers on the chances of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s implementation chances have dealt with the incentives for strategic behaviour both 
on the demand and the supply side.
10 Above all in the case of global trading, strategic activities 
will also induce implications for developing countries. 
 
Looking first at the supply side, a strong incentive to increase the profits from permits sales by 
restricting the overall supply are given. As has already extensively analysed in literature, the 
consequences of exerting monopoly power comprise a higher market permit price, increased 
energy resource costs and a drastic shift of the gains from trade to the suppliers. Ellerman, 
Jacoby and Decaux (1998) investigate two cases, one based on cartel by the Non-Annex B and 
the second consisting of a full supplier monopoly, including both the Non-Annex B countries 
and Russia. Both cases confirm the above-mentioned effects of a successful monopoly and 
                                                       
9 A leakage rate of 6% is found by Babiker and Jacoby (1999) based on the EPPA-GTAP model and is in 
line with the results of the EPPA-GREEN model (Jacoby et al., 1997), the OECD’s GREEN model 
(Burniaux, Martin, Nicoletti, and Oliveira-Martins, 1992) and the G-Cubed model (McKibbin et al., 
1999). Burniaux and Truong (2002) find a leakage rate that amounts to 7%. 
10 For further details see Böhringer and Löschel (2001,  2002); Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo, and 
Galeotti (2001); Buchner, Carraro, and Cersosimo (2002), Manne and Richels (2001).   
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demonstrate that all the involved countries always continue to gain from emissions trading. 
However, the stronger the monopoly, the lower are the gains for the Annex B countries and the 
higher are the profits for Non-Annex B countries and Russia. In particular, the gains for the 
Non-Annex B regions are tripled by establishing a full supplier monopoly. 
 
Cases of strategic behaviour have also been discussed on the demand side. Particular attention 
has been attracted by the proposal of imposing a ceiling on permit imports, which would restrict 
the number of permits which Annex B countries can use in order to increase the percentage of 
domestic abatement activities
11. Investigating three cases of increasingly restricted permit 
imports on global emissions trading, Ellerman, Jacoby and Decaux (1998) illustrate that 
demand-side restrictions lead to the expected results: the more drastic the quantitative import 
limit, the lower the demand for permits and therefore the lower the market prices. Consequently, 
the gains for the permit exporters, comprising Russia and the Non-Annex B, diminish 
consistently when the limit on permit imports are strengthened. Imposing for example an import 
limit of 25% reduces the Non-Annex B gains by almost 97%. At the same time, also the permit-
importing regions lose notwithstanding the lower market price, because they have to engage in 
more expensive abatement activities and therefore face much higher overall costs. Kemfert 
(1999) analyses two types of ceilings on emissions trading, represented by a low and a high cap 
on trade. The results of this study confirm negative implications for developing countries 
resulting from permit restrictions. Again, the developments of the terms of trade induce 
international negative trade spillover effects. Summarising, import restrictions lead to two 
results: (i) the gains resulting from emissions trading are redistributed among the importers from 
those facing the highest abatement costs to those characterised by the lowest abatement costs, 
and (ii) the overall costs of meeting the emission reduction targets are increased since both 
importing and exporting regions are made worse off. 
 
 
The first two columns of Table 5 summarise the findings.  
 
3.2  Existing Energy Policies 
 
Analyses of climate agreements like the Kyoto Protocol usually assume that emission control 
programs are implemented through imposition of a tax on fossil fuels, reflecting the fuels’ 
differential carbon content, or of a cap-and-trade system which leads to a common price of 
carbon emissions across sources. However, circumstances are more complicated in reality since 
most countries already have a variety of fuel taxes that have been in use over decades. If   
existing fossil fuel taxes are not the efficient responses to the external effects of fuel use, then 
they will be responsible for the distortion of economic decisions. As a consequence, Babiker 
and Jacoby (1999) and Babiker, Reilly, and Jacoby (1999) investigate the interactions of the 
Kyoto-policies with existing fossil fuel taxes and analyse whether their removal improves 
economic efficiency and welfare. Indeed, the results demonstrate that the negative effects on 
energy-exporting regions are considerably decreased when replacing fuel taxes. As a 
consequence of the reduced fall in oil prices, a harmonisation halts the deterioration of the oil 
exporters’ terms of trade and therefore restricts their welfare losses. These studies find that even 
non-oil-exporting Non-Annex B countries prefer carbon-based taxes to distorted fuel taxes. In 
addition, Annex B countries also benefit from a switch to a carbon-based increase in fuel prices, 
the magnitude of the gains being strongly correlated to the existing fuel tax distortions (e.g., the 
                                                       
11 A ceiling has been proposed by the European Union in order to strengthen the “supplementarity” 
provision of the Kyoto Protocol. However, in the course of the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, the 
EU has abandoned its request for a concrete ceiling.   12
big winner is Europe). Summarising, a harmonised fuel tax appears to be beneficial to both 
Annex B and Non-Annex B regions.  
 
A further distortion which is prevailing in the energy system of many nations are subsidies to 
the production of coal, which intended to encourage the use of coal at the expense of other 
energy sources. Babiker, Reilly, and Jacoby (1999) therefore look at the removal of coal 
subsidies in the key countries - Europe and more generally the OECD - and find that the adverse 
effects on Non-Annex B energy exporters are reduced. However, the welfare effects are small, 
i.e. neutral or positive, and there are no significant changes for the oil-exporting developing 
countries. The authors explain this result by their model specifications which include a coal 
sector that is too small for making a difference to the OECD regions. The only observable 
positive impact is seen in South Africa where coal exports to the OECD play an important role. 
 
The insights of the last two subsections demonstrate that a more efficiently implemented climate 
change control gains by smaller costs and the minimisation of unintended consequences. For 
example, inefficient supply implies a higher market price, greater world costs and fewer gains 
from trade. Notwithstanding these results, the mentioned studies conclude that the gains are still 
considerable. Similar implications are found in the context of distortions, such as import 
limitations and non-competitive pricing, which induce higher benefits for a small part of he 
market only in the initial phase, and therefore still justify the implementation of emissions 
trading.  
 
The third column of Table 5 summarises the findings.  
 
3.3  Direct Measures to Reduce the Effects on Developing Countries 
 
In addition to the possibility to make policies more efficient by removing existing distortions, 
also direct measures that go beyond general accompanying policies can be used to reduce the 
effects of the Kyoto Protocol’s implementation on developing countries. 
 
Babiker, Reilly, and Jacoby (1999) consider two options: preferential tariff reductions for Non-




The first strategy consists of removing tariffs for Non-Annex B countries from goods imported 
into Annex B regions, excluding energy and energy-intensive goods.
12 As has been expected, 
these concessions lead to welfare losses in all the Annex B countries with the exception of 
Russia. Developing countries are affected in differing ways, some of them benefiting while 
other ones which suffer strong welfare losses from the Kyoto Protocol are almost not influenced 
(e.g., the Persian Gulf countries). Therefore, such a policy would benefit developing countries 
in general, but would not produce relief to those regions which are especially negatively 
affected by the agreement’s implementation. 
 
The second possibility to change directly the effects of the Kyoto Protocol lies in direct 
financial compensations to developing countries. Babiker, Reilly, and Jacoby (1999) calculate 
the level of financial flows that would be required in order to compensate Non-Annex B 
countries for the losses arising from the Kyoto Protocol. They find that an overall annual 
financial transfer from OECD countries to Non-Annex B regions of $27.6 billion is needed in 
the year 2010, more than 50% being directed towards Persian Gulf nations. In addition, also 
                                                       
12 The authors justify this exclusion by the conflict with the objectives of the Climate Convention.   
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North Africa, Venezuela, Mexico and Indonesia would need substantial transfers in order to 
cover their losses. The implementation of a permit trading scheme would reduce the direct 
transfers by about 25%, to $20 billion. Instead of eliminating all the welfare losses, a further 
strategy could only aim at mitigating the adverse effects which would drastically reduce the 
needed level of financial transfers to about $14.5 billion, still concentrated on a few regions.  
 
 
4.  The Impact of The Kyoto Protocol on Developing Countries When Technical 
Change Is Endogenous 
 
One very important element for the study of the impact of a Climate agreement on individual 
nations or groups of countries is technological change. If, on the one hand, current rates of 
greenhouse gas emissions cannot be sustained in the long run, on the other no one really 
believes or is ready to accept that the solution of the climate change problem consists of 
reducing the pace of economic growth. This is especially true for developing nations. Instead, it 
is believed that changes in technology will bring about the longed decoupling of economic 
growth from generation of polluting emissions. There is a difference in attitude in this respect, 
though. Some maintain a faithful view that technological change, having a life of its own, will 
automatically solve the problem. Others express the conviction that the process of technological 
change by and large responds to impulses and incentives, and it has therefore to be fostered by 
appropriate policy actions. 
 
The above remarks are reflected in climate models, the main quantitative tools designed either 
to depict long run energy and pollution scenarios or to assist in climate change policy analysis. 
Indeed, these models have traditionally accounted for the presence of technical change, albeit 
usually evolving in an exogenous fashion. By and large, this is also the case of the models used 
to produce the results reported in the previous sections. More recently, however, models have 
been proposed where the technology changes endogenously and/or its change is induced by 
deliberate choices of agents and government intervention. 
 
The issue is clearly quite relevant. For instance, most arguments advanced in support of the 
introduction of ceilings to emission trading are based on the view that the widespread adoption 
of flexibility mechanisms reduces the incentives to carry out R&D, thereby reducing the 
effectiveness and increasing the costs of abatement options in the long run. Moreover, the 
incentives for R&D induced by the presence of ceilings on the use of flexibility mechanisms 
may spill over into other sectors, thus speeding up the “engine of growth”, and reducing the 
impact of climate change control on per capita income and welfare in the long-run. Finally, the 
stimuli to technical and social innovation in rich countries will sooner or later be transferred to 
poor countries via trade in goods and services and knowledge transmission. All these 
considerations demonstrate that a convincing analysis of climate policy design - particularly of 
the role of emission trading and of the ceilings issue - requires a careful specification of 
technical change (see Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo, and Galeotti, 2001). 
  
Recent theoretical work on endogenous growth has shown that aggregate technological 
externalities within countries may help explain many of the observed patterns of growth across 
countries. Castelnuovo, Galeotti, Gambarelli, and Vergalli (2002) and Buonanno, Carraro, and 
Galeotti (2003) modify a popular climate model which allows for both endogenous and induced 
technical change. Endogenous growth is captured by assuming that sectoral spillovers within 
countries and human capital induce increasing returns to scale in output production. Induced 
technical change takes place through R&D investments or via experience (Learning-by-Doing).   
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In particular, Buonanno, Carraro, Castelnuovo, and Galeotti (2001) and Buonanno, Carraro, and 
Galeotti (2003) assume that R&D investment accumulates into a stock of knowledge that affects 
both the production technology (endogenous technical change) and the emission-output ratio 
(induced technical change). Extending Nordhaus and Yang (1996)’s RICE model it is assumed 
that the stock of knowledge enters the production function as one of the production factors and, 
at the same time, affects the emission-output ratio. Thus, the idea is that more knowledge will 
help firms increase their productivity and reduce their negative impact on the environment. In 
this modified version, the central planner in each country chooses the optimal R&D effort that, 
in turn, increases the stock of technological knowledge. The amount of R&D is therefore a 
policy variable envisaged by the model. 
 
Castelnuovo, Galeotti, Gambarelli, and Vergalli (2002) propose an alternative formulation of 
the same model allows for an alternative source of technical change, Learning by Doing. In 
particular, it is supposed that the accumulation of knowledge occurs not as a result of deliberate 
(R&D) efforts, but as a side effect of conventional economic activity. In this extension of the 
RICE model, the authors model LdB in the simplest way, that is by assuming that learning 
occurs as a side effect of the accumulation of new physical capital. This entails a production 
function that exhibits increasing returns to capital. In order to maintain the analogy with the 
R&D-based version of the model we also allow for the emission-output ratio to depend upon 
cumulated capacity, i.e. the sum of past physical investment efforts. It should be apparent that 
these model specifications make explicit reference to the recently developed theory of 
endogenous growth that emphasizes the role of knowledge, of physical and human capital, R&D 
activities, and LbD. 
 
In this section we simulate the model just described, which we labeled “ETC-RICE”, and 
consider separately the impact on Annex B and Non-Annex B countries of the implementation 
of the Kyoto Protocol. In particular we consider three regimens: a No Trade case, Annex B 
Trading, and Global Trade of emissions, all relative to the Business As Usual (BAU) scenario. 
In keeping with the previous section we concentrate on welfare and on emissions and compare 
the R&D and LbD versions of endogenous and induced technical change.
13 
 
The findings are presented in Table 6. 
 
The first striking result is that the specification of endogenous/induced technical change does 
not seem to make a difference. Indeed, the reduction in regional emissions under the Protocol is 
larger with LbD that with R&D, though overall emissions are essentially unaffected by the 
difference. Welfare losses are a bit smaller for Annex B countries under R&D, but there is no 
difference for Non-Annex B regions. 
 
The second result is that the findings are in line with previous research. The imposition of 
emission reduction targets adversely affects the welfare of Annex B regions, but this loss is 
moderated by resorting to emission trading. This is true of global trade in particular. What about 
Non-Annex B nations? Because they are not subject to emission limits their welfare does not 
suffer from implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. It is virtually unchanged regardless of the 
trading regime. 
 
The same picture emerges if we look at output, where Non-Annex B countries experience 
slightly positive economic growth. This is stronger with global trade, possibly because of the 
                                                       
13 The model is regional: we aggregate Annex B and Non-Annex B regions. Simulations are carried out 
up until 2100. The Global Trade scenario entails the Non-annex B regions entering the permit market in 
2020 with BAU emissions as constraints. The model is described in the papers cited or in a companion 
paper to the present one (Galeotti, 2002).   
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positive effect of revenues generated by selling permits on the market. The fact that the permit 
price is lower under global trade relative to Annex B trade may help explain why Annex B 
nations can turn a slowdown into an expansion of economic activity (though numbers are very 
small). 
 
The overall message relayed by these results appears to be twofold. The implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol harms neither the welfare nor the economic growth of developing countries. 
Thus emission reductions can be achieved without imposing economic costs on the 
development process of those regions. It remains however true that overall emissions are met 
with the largest reductions when LDCs participate in the agreement and trade of rights to emit is 
open to all countries. In this case the results show that Non-Annex B countries essentially 
neither gain nor lose from a welfare or an output growth viewpoints. 
 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
 
Although developing countries face a drastic increase in their greenhouse gas emissions, 
economic development represents in nearly all cases a priority relative to other issues like 
emission control. A crucial policy question is therefore whether international climate 
agreements like the Kyoto Protocol provide an opportunity for growth to this region, while 
curbing overall emissions.  
 
The first step toward solving this problem is to provide an answer to what is the impact - 
qualitatively and quantitatively - of the Kyoto Protocol as it is now on developing countries. 
The present chapter has been concerned precisely with this issue. In particular, we provided an 
overview of research studies undertaken in this context. It turns out that important differences 
exist whether or not the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms - emission trading in particular – are in 
effect. Similarly, the issue of constraints on the demand and supply sides of the permit market, 
due to exogenously imposed ceilings or to market power, have important consequences for the 
impact of the Protocol on developing countries. Finally, we have noted that the role of 
endogenous and induced technical change is critical in that it is this process that in principle 
allows the decoupling of economic growth from harmful emissions.   16
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Table 1: Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on Developing Countries in the No Trade Case 








Countries  Total Total 
 EV











Babiker and Jacoby 
(1999)  + 0.55  + 2.32  -10.80  - 28.93  - 10.25  - 26.61  - 4.95  + 1.17 
Babiker, Reilly, and 
Jacoby (1999)   + 0.55  + 2.32  - 10.80  - 28.93  - 10.25  - 26.61  - 4.95  + 1.17 
Bernstein et al. 
(1999)(i)
c  + 0.02  - 0.85  - 1.35  - 3.53  - 1.33  - 4.38  - 3.04  - 1.34 
Bernstein et al. 
(1999)(ii)  - 0.04  -  - 1.39  -  - 1.43  -  - 2.99  - 
Böhringer and 
Rutherford (1999)  - 0.55%  -  - 1.45%  -  - 2.00% -  - 1.19%  + 0.04%
Burniaux and Truong 
(2002)
d  + 0.24  + 0.29  - 1.0  - 3.02  - 0.76  - 2.73  - 3.05  + 1.11 
Böhringer and 
Löschel (2002)
e  + 0.45  -  - 0.54  -  - 0.09  -  - 1.72  - 
 
Notes to the table: 
a)  Percentage changes are computed with respect to the amount of emissions in the reference case 
without any climate agreement in 2010. 
b)  EV is the Equivalent Variation measure of welfare expressed in percentage terms It roughly shows 
by how much regional well-being - basically the level of consumption - changes as a result of 
policy intervention.  Secondary benefits of pollution control or the benefits of a lowered risk of 
climate change are not considered.  
c)  This analysis investigates different baseline scenarios. We replicate the results for the medium case, 
the so-called reference scenario. 
d)  This analysis uses welfare effects in terms of percentage change in per capita utility of the 
representative household. 
e)  Welfare effects are measured in percentage change of real consumption as compared to Business As 
Usual (BAU).   
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Table 2: Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on Developing Countries with Annex B Trading 
  BAU vs. Kyoto With Annex B Trading  
Percentage Change 
 




Countries  Total Total 
 EV











Babiker and Jacoby 
(1999)  + 0.52  -  - 7.86  -  - 7.34  -  + 4.04  - 
Babiker, Reilly, and 
Jacoby (1999)   + 0.52  -  - 7.86  -  - 7.34  -  + 4.04  - 
Bernstein et al. 
(1999)(i)  - 0.03  - 0.22  - 1.13  - 2.43  - 1.16  - 2.65  + 2.73  + 0.05 
Bernstein et al. 
(1999)(ii)  + 0.09  -  - 1.15  -  - 1.06  -  + 2.84  - 
Burniaux and Truong 
(2002)
  + 0.18  + 0.21  - 0.73  - 2.19  - 0.55  - 1.98  + 1.09  + 1.76 
Böhringer and 
Löschel (2002)  + 0.33  -  - 0.43  -  - 0.1  -  + 4.92  - 
 
Notes to the table: see Table 1. 
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Table 3: Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on Developing Countries with Global Trading 
  BAU vs. Kyoto With Annex B Trading  
Percentage Change 
 




Countries  Total Total 
 EV











Babiker and Jacoby 
(1999)  + 0.28  -  - 3.12  -  - 2.84  -  + 0.97  - 
Babiker, Reilly, and 
Jacoby (1999)   - - - - - - - - 
Bernstein et al. 
(1999)(i)  + 0.63  - 0.06  - 0.38  - 1.40  + 0.25  - 1.46  - 0.04  - 0.68 
Bernstein et al. 
(1999)(ii)  + 0.81  -  - 0.36  -  + 0.45  -  - 0.04  - 
Burniaux and Truong 
(2002)
  + 0.54  - 0.48  - 0.53  - 1.47  + 0.01  - 1.95  - 0.05  + 0.38 
Böhringer and 
Löschel (2002)  + 0.36  -  - 0.53  -  - 0.17  -  + 2.21  - 
 
Notes to the table: see Table 1. 
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Table 4: Implications of the Kyoto Protocol - Changes in World Emissions 
 
Emissions (in Non-Annex B countries)
a 
 




Burniaux and Truong 
(2002)  + 2  + 1  - 19 
Ellerman, Jacoby and 
Decaux (1998)
b  +/- 0  +/- 0  - 18 
Ellerman and Decaux 
(1998)
c  - 13.74  - 13.50  - 13.89 
Den Elzen and de 
Moor (2001)  +/- 0  - 2.4  - 
 
Notes to the table: 
a)  Percentage changes are computed with respect to the amount of emissions in the reference case 
without any climate agreement in 2010. 
b)  These are per capita emissions in Non-Annex B countries. It is assumed that they are at the 
reference level of 0.74 tC/cap until global emissions trading is allowed for. 
c) World  emissions. 
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Table 5: Implications of the Kyoto Protocol for Developing Countries - The Role of Strategic 
Behaviour and Adaptation Policies 
  Policies Affecting the Implications of the 





Supply Side  Demand Side 
Energy Policy 
Babiker and Jacoby 
(1999)
b 
No cartel: - 10.25 
“OPEC cartel”: - 22.64 
- 
Distortions: - 10.25 
Harmonisation: - 8.28 
Babiker, Reilly, and 
Jacoby (1999)
b   - - 
Distortions: - 10.25 
Harmonisation: - 8.28“ 
Ellerman and Decaux 
(1998)
c 
Annex B Cartel: + 119.9 
Annex B+Russia: + 194.6
- - 
Ellerman, Jacoby, and 
Decaux (1998)
c 
Annex B Cartel: + 119.9 
Annex B+Russia: + 194.6
Import limitations: 
25% limit: - 97.1 
50% limit: - 66.7 
75% limit: - 6.9 
- 
Kemfert (1999)
d   
Ceiling compared to 
Annex B trading: 
10% limit: - 0.93 
80% limit - 1.82 
- 
 
Notes to the table: 
a) Percentage  changes. 
b)  Changes refer to Equivalent Variation relative to baseline cases. 
c)  Changes refer to gains from trade relative to baseline cases 
d)  These results correspond to the assumption of a medium emissions level. 
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Table 5: Implications of the Kyoto Protocol for Developing Countries - The Role of Strategic 
Behaviour and Adaptation Policies 
  Policies Affecting the Implications of the 





Supply Side  Demand Side 
Energy Policy 
Babiker and Jacoby 
(1999)
b 
No cartel: - 10.25 
“OPEC cartel”: - 22.64 
- 
Distortions: - 10.25 
Harmonisation: - 8.28 
Babiker, Reilly, and 
Jacoby (1999)
b   - - 
Distortions: - 10.25 
Harmonisation: - 8.28“ 
Ellerman and Decaux 
(1998)
c 
Annex B Cartel: + 119.9 
Annex B+Russia: + 194.6
- - 
Ellerman, Jacoby, and 
Decaux (1998)
c 
Annex B Cartel: + 119.9 
Annex B+Russia: + 194.6
Import limitations: 
25% limit: - 97.1 
50% limit: - 66.7 
75% limit: - 6.9 
- 
 
Notes to the table: 
e) Percentage  changes. 
f)  Changes refer to Equivalent Variation relative to baseline cases. 
g)  Changes refer to gains from trade relative to baseline cases 
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Table6: Implications of the Kyoto Protocol Under Endogenous and Induced Technical Change
a 
   
Non-Annex B  Annex B Countries 














B Trade vs 
BAU 
  R&D - Based Technical Change 
Welfare
b  + 0.01  + 0.01  0  - 0.20  - 0.11  - 0.03 
Emissions  0 0  - 17  - 41  -419  - 14 
Output  + 0.02  + 0.02  + 0.04  - 0.81  - 0.30  + 0.14 
No Trade vs BAU  Annex B Trade vs BAU  Global Trade vs BAU 
Overall 
Emissions 
- 11  - 11  - 16 
  LbD - Based Technical Change 
Welfare  + 0.01  + 0.01  + 0.01  - 0.35  - 0.30  - 0.09 
Emissions  0 0  - 16  - 45  - 45  - 14 
Output  + 0.03  + 0.03  + 0.02  - 0.73  - 0.54  + 0.18 
No Trade vs BAU  Annex B Trade vs BAU  Global Trade vs BAU 
Overall 
Emissions 
- 11  - 11  - 15 
 
Notes to the table: 
a)  Percentage changes are computed with respect to the amount of emissions in the reference case 
without any climate agreement in 2010. 
b)  Welfare is defined as the present discounted value of consumption. 
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